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Abstract
     Use of the World Wide Web (WWW) for instruction
has grown dramatically in the last two years.  Almost
every major university in the US has some distance
education offering [1].  Increasing competition and
shrinking resources within public institutions have
accelerated the growth of this technological innovation.
Recent press on the subject suggests, however, that
“education at a distance” is meeting tremendous
resistance in some corners [7],[8].
     While academia grapples with delivery mechanisms
for the product that they market, the market itself is
changing.  There seems to be an equally dramatic change
occurring in the demographics of the learner population.
Adults returning to education settings represent a rapidly
growing educational market segment.  Almost half of all
post-secondary students are now working adults over 24
years of age [9].  Universities and their faculties have
given this historically small segment little commitment in
the past.  For the most part, they continue to do little to
accommodate the problems of a maturing post-secondary
student population: managers with difficult travel
schedules, disabled adults with physical challenges,
parents with child care responsibilities, and adult children
who have elder care demands.
     Distance education can be compared to other
innovations that have disrupted established organizations.
Problems experienced by other organizations facing
rapidly changing technologies and markets bear striking
similarities to the problems faced by universities in
dealing with Web-based instruction and the changing
demographics in the student population.  Solutions
likewise can be found by looking at the history of various
disruptive innovations and the strategies common to the
survivors.
      A framework provided by Clayton Christensen [2],
based on the “innovators’ dilemma” in several
commercial organizations, provides a viewpoint for the
authors’ analysis.  He proposes four recognizable
environmental conditions for “disruptive technologies”
which can be seen to apply to the advent of online
education:  1) the potential market size and financial
return for the disruptive technology is not known; 2)
small niche markets aren’t expected to solve the problems
of large institutions who face increasing competition and
shrinking resources; 3) the customers of and investors in
the institutions will dictate the eventual use of the
resources; and 4) over time, the basis for customer choice
will include functionality, reliability, convenience, and
price. In this paper, we portray distance education
delivered via the WWW as a disruptive innovation and
the mature learner as a disruptive consumer that can be
combined into successful avenues for academic
institutions.  Four recommendations are made for a
successful online education strategy.
The Innovator’s Dilemma
     Like most institutions, universities serve a market and
like to keep track of their market performance.  While
sometimes resisting the use of the term “customer,”
educators are in the business of providing a product and
they strive to be better than their competitors at supplying
that product.  Likewise, in most institutions, at some
point, a new approach is introduced to providing a
product.  If the institution is a bookseller, the new
approach may be the introduction of Web-based
shopping.  The response of the bookseller may be that this
is not the business that they are in.  Use of the Web is
gimmicky and lies at the bottom of the market in terms of
quality and margins.  If the institution is a large state-
funded university, the new approach may be Web-based
teaching.  The university decision-makers may also
respond that this is not the business that they are in.
Education belongs in the classroom.
     Clayton Christensen [2] provides several examples of
institutions facing such new approaches and technologies.
One powerful example involves the story of steel
minimills.  Minimills produce cost-competitive molten
steel from scrap steel.  They are called minimills because
the scale necessary to process scrap steel is significantly
less than what is needed for an integrated mill to produce
molten steel from iron ore.
     The first products produced in minimills in the 1960’s
were of marginal quality.  The only market for the
minimill producers was for steel reinforcing bars
(“rebars”) which was at the bottom of the market in terms
of quality, cost and margins.  The big steel makers were
not interested in the rebar market because, not only were
the margins low, the price-driven customers were the least
loyal.  Time-tested managerial practices suggested
continued aggressive investment in the premium end of
the market, paying close attention to the mainstream
customers.
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      Minimills, however, had much different cost
structures than the integrated mills.  They had less
equipment and therefore less depreciation expense.  The
minimills could usually sell all of their rebar simply by
making a few phone calls so marketing costs were
minimal.  Finally, they had no research and development
costs.  Over a thirty year period, they were able to
improve the quality of their steel and infiltrate markets
other than rebar.  The minimill market share increased
from essentially zero in 1965 to 40% in 1995 and will
probably account for half of all steel production by the
turn of the century.  Not one of the world’s integrated
steel companies has built a mill employing minimill
technology, still certain that this is not the business that
they are in.
     The difficulty, of course, is how to improve the
performance of established products and still recognize
important disruptive technologies and markets.
Disruptive technologies often result in worse product
performance, at least in the near term.  There are many
examples of industries facing disruptive technologies like
the integrated steel mills.  The personal computer
disrupted the larger computer manufacturers; transistors
disrupted in the vacuum tube market, HMO’s disrupted
conventional health insurers, small off-road motorcycles
disrupted the powerful over-the-road cycle manufacturers;
and discount retailing disrupted the department stores.
     Why do leading organizations frequently stumble
when confronting disruptive technologies?  Christensen
develops three themes.
   Over time, development strategies generally have a
“northeastern pull.”  Resource allocation processes
direct resources towards new product proposals that
promise higher margins or larger markets.  Organizational
graphs and charts are expected to show better speed,
capacity, throughput, profits, etc. over time.  That is,
performance plots are expected to be northeastern vectors.
Organizations tend to ignore technologies that do not
improve what is perceived as the most important
attributes of product performance in light of customers’
needs.  Products’ attributes and the customers’ needs,
however, are derived from a frame of reference involving
past choices. Established organizations have a practiced
capability of giving customers more and better versions of
the same thing.
  Most large organizations do not want to look
downward at small, emerging markets.  While most
organizations seem to be very good at delivering more
and better versions of the same thing, they seem to have a
great deal of trouble with downward vision and mobility.
It becomes increasingly difficult for larger, established
organizations to enter small, radically different markets
even if they are destined to become larger in the future.
This is not just a matter of bureaucracy or complacency.
Companies build capabilities in their products based on
historical choices about which problems should be solved
and which should be avoided.
     To address disruptive innovation, a different value
network must be developed which changes strategies
and cost structures.  Christensen defines a value network
as “ - the context in which a firm identifies and responds
to customers’ needs, solves problems, procures input,
reacts to competitors, and strives for profit.”  Many
disruptive technologies are championed by new firms
because of the inability of established organizations to
change strategies and cost structures, not technologies.
     There is much evidence that even the universities that
are embracing online instruction are having trouble
changing strategies and cost structures.  Research
suggests that models of instruction appropriate for the
Web are sorely lacking.  Universities and faculties are
attempting to shoe old models for instruction onto the
Web with suboptimal results [3].  Wolcott [10] warns that
the culture of faculty rewards has not changed to
accommodate faculty work in distance education.
What History Teaches Us
     Will the classic university survive?  Will the learners
of tomorrow make different choices in terms of
functionality, reliability, convenience, and price?  Will
half the educational market be lost to entrant cyberschools
that better accommodate the new learner types and the
necessary strategies for successful Web-based
instruction?  History teaches us that some established
organizations are able to accomodate both sustaining
technologies and disruptive technologies.  By looking at
those organizations that are successful, Christensen points
the way for academic institutions that are wanting to
explore distance education but are struggling with
developing the necessary strategies and cost structures.
Success-driven institutions can draw from his study
involving hundreds of organizations facing disruptive
technologies.  His work provides four suggestions.
     Develop and deliver distance education through
projects where learners need it most.  By the year 2001,
more than 15 million adults are expected to be in the
market for higher education.  These students will also fill
a wide range of other roles: employees, spouses, parents,
citizens, community and church leaders, and adult care
providers [6].  Their needs will define a very different
educational market than has been seen in the past, namely
that of the 18 to 22 year old, who has parent-financing,
and lives in a dorm on campus.
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     Many researchers suggests that finding the right match
between students and programs will be the basis for
viability of US institutions in the future ([4],[5].  Most
distance education course currently offered, are online
counterparts to traditional for-credit offerings.  The new
market will include demand for many additional offerings
such as continuing education courses, refresher and
retooling courses, and professional certification programs.
Schools should search out distance education niches for
the mature learner in which they can grow and survive.
     Place these projects in organizational subunits that
are small enough to get excited about small
opportunities and small wins.  Not only do schools need
to find the right courses to offer, they need to empower
the right people to select the appropriate technologies and
create the right organizational structure to deliver the
courses.  The impetus for change must come from a group
that is small and focused enough to short-circuit the
debates over the value of the disruptive technology in
light of the value of competencies previously cultivated.
     The climate among faculty at large with regard to
distance education is skeptical at best.  Web-based
courses do not seem to address the needs of the current
customers, they promise the university little in terms of
profit, and do not seem to enhance the career
opportunities for talented academicians.  The environment
in which online instruction is executed should be
controlled to the extent that everyone involved views
success as crucial to their future and the future of the
organization.
     Plan to fail early and inexpensively searching for
the proper market.  Failure, in the economic sense, is
inevitable when looking for initial applications for
disruptive technologies.  Measurement of success must be
very different than success with a sustaining technology.
We have a reasonably good idea of what we are looking
for as outcomes in the traditional classroom setting.  We
are able to plan offerings, enrollments, and revenues.
     Less is known about what an online market needs or
how large the market will be.  Early offerings may not be
economical.  Early adopters will fail to predict precisely
how the new technology will be used and the size of the
market.  Success should be measured in terms of the new
knowledge gained about new customers and applications.
     Value the attributes of the disruptive product
rather than looking for a breakthrough that will
enable the disruptive product to compete in
mainstream markets.  The Web presents novel avenues
to facilitate learning including opportunities to build
collaborative learning teams and to encourage global
communities [3].  Online instruction can provide “any
where, any time education” for mature learners.  It should
not be seen to compete in the current market for
professor-centered university instruction.  Subunits, that
are commissioned to define projects for the new
technology, should value the attributes unique to the Web
rather than focusing on the capabilities that are missing.
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